In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel distinguishes and raises thought from other mental faculties, by virtue of the fact that “thinking […] is […] the active universal and, more precisely, the universal that acts itself” (§20). In considering this, we will first reconstruct the universality of thinking, as well as how thinking takes itself to be its own object––thus ‘acting’ itself.
In doing so, we will situate thought as informing the structure of the dialectic of philosophy, which is itself the highest form of thought. Finally, we will touch upon the other faculties, and how thinking ultimately is distinguished from them.
In order to grasp thought, it is necessary to grasp the structure of the dialectic; Hegel writes, “The realization that the dialectic makes up the very nature of thinking…constitutes a cardinal aspect of logic” (§11). We will also consider the development of philosophy in parallel, as speculative thought, in its “peculiar” form, belongs to it.
We must first understand necessity, which arises in subjective reason and begets speculative thought––necessity can only be found in the process of thinking things over, as all other experience begins with “ immediacies, accidental findings, presuppositions”, and the universal is left undetermined. Succinctly, in response to this need, speculative thinking is born. Further, the content of philosophy is actuality, thus necessitating an agreement with the world; “the highest goal of the philosophical science…is to bring about the reconciliation of the reason that is conscious of itself with the reason that exists, or with actuality, through the knowledge of this agreement.” (§6)
We must now understand how thinking begins with experience, in terms of its negative relation to it. Thinking begins as a reaction to the stimuli given in the form of experience––elevating itself above the sensory element via abstraction, it thus puts distance between itself and its point of departure by defining itself as the negative of what is at hand. This is thought in its immediacy. Thought is now “being-at-home-with-itself” (§12). In order to break free from the stasis of satisfaction in-itself, we require stimuli that will force thinking to develop the form and content from out of itself. For philosophy, the empirical sciences take such a role; the empirical sciences have as their station the imperative task of, as it were, forming the first stage of thought. As reflective thought must have thought as its subject, philosophy takes the particularized content prepared by the empirical sciences as its object of consideration. At the same time, it enters a symbiotic relationship with empirical science, as it “bestows upon their contents the most essential shape of the freedom of thought”(§12).
In addition, to return to the more general structure of thought, within the first moment, there can already be found the element of mediation. One may understand this by examining the dialectics; though the first two moments seem distinct, they are never separate––what Hegel calls an “inseparable combination” (§12). Here, mediation is to be understood as that which begins with something and proceeds to a next item that is defined by the first standing “over and against it”(§12); by virtue of the negative relation between thought and its sensory object, already, there stands to be mediation. Thus, thinking is mediatory in character and needs an element of immediacy to set it into motion. Thinking, mediated and so reflected into itself, now exists in universality as a priori thought; in the realm of philosophy, such a stage of development would be that of formalism. And, it is precisely the quality of having itself for itself that makes something universal. Thought itself thus forms a circle, mirroring the structure of “circle of circles” that philosophy takes; the structure of thought informs the structure of philosophical dialectics.
Stepping back, it should be noted that within the inseparability of the initial two moments already lay the necessary foundation for universality. The relevancy of this reveals a further character of dialectics, in that what is developed from an initial item is never added unto, but always derived. In other words, the active universality of thought was contained already in its immediacy.
A peculiarity in the Hegelian structure is that of the need to, as it were, close ‘distance’ in order for progression to occur. We see this in the concept of bad infinity, for example, where what is being conditioned and the conditioned are, at first, external to each other, entailing a separateness, or distance. The next step is for the conditioned to be subsumed into what it conditions, so that it becomes itself in itself––only then, after closing the gap, does the opposition cease, and sublation occur. Here, we see that same formula utilized in the development of thought, where thought, beginning as a negative, distanced relation, ultimately takes itself as its own object as an active universal.
Imagination, which deals in images, lacks the structure of having itself for itself. It is thus incapable of sublating as a whole due to separateness, as we have previously established, and can merely abstract contents from images. Nevertheless, both thinking and imagination begin with experience, abstracting from it. In other words, imagination can never “act itself” as thinking does. However, what ultimately sets thinking apart from all other faculties is a difference in forms–– “forms that must be distinguished from thought as form” (§2). That form for reflective thought is the active universal, entailing that it has itself for itself, thus allowing sublation to occur.
There is a further nuance that Hegel makes in which the form of thinking peculiar in philosophy is distinguished from other modes of thought. The sort of thinking that has been reconstructed in this paper is specifically of a kind called ‘reflective thinking’, which “has thoughts per se for its content and brings them as such to consciousness” (§2). The thinking present in other disciplines such as religion lacks the reflective structure present in philosophy; there is a sort of admixture of thought and other faculties, where thinking acts as a permeating and determining force. Nevertheless, it is only in thinking about what has been thought over that we can have the true acting universal, the reflective thought, which constitutes all philosophy. Thought, in a way, has a transformative power––“At any rate, thinking them over has at least this effect, namely, that of transforming the feelings, representations, etc., into thoughts” (§5). This power lies, once again, in its being an active universal.
In conclusion, reflective thinking is to be distinguished from all other mental faculties via its form as the active universal, which takes thought to be its own object of thought. It may be further distinguished from thought as utilized in fields such as ethics or religion, where it is intermixed with the other mental faculties. We can understand reflective thought to be mediatory in its immediacy––that it has as its reflection into itself, universality, or, having itself for itself. In philosophy, such a relation is facilitated by the empirical sciences, which provide the thought that thought takes as its object, allowing thinking to develop out of itself. In the dialectics, reflective thought is thus vested with the power to sublate, as opposed to the rest of the cognitive faculties, which remain in stasis.








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